A recent discussion of the value of moral
absolutes has led
me to take a closer look at my personal philosophy and to try to define
where
it lies within the standard moral views. This will probably remain an
ongoing work in progress.
Moral Absolutism
This holds that there is a
single, universal moral
standard
that cuts across all cultures. This idea runs into some problems.
First,
some moral
concepts may not make any sense in certain cultural contexts. A culture
that
has no concept of personal property cannot have theft being immoral.
Whether saving
face (your own or another’s) is a moral imperative would depend to a
considerable degree on the degree of value your society placed on the
concept
of “face”. Secondly, the question remains of whose
single moral
standard is imposed. This is generally answered by reference to the
morality
imposed by a postulated creator. In fact many make the ludicrous claim
that
morality is impossible without belief in and fear of said creator. An
obvious
counterexample is Confucianism. Even acceptance of a creator may be
insufficient for a single moral standard. Let us take the sixth
commandment
“Thou shalt not kill”:
- Quakers interpret this through complete pacificism;
- the Pope (and like-minded Catholics) interpret this as to
forbid capital punishment, abortion and even contraception, but
generally
permit “a just war” (though the definition of a “just war” is widely
debated,
particularly recently).;
- fundamentalist Protestants permit warfare and capital
punishment, but not abortion; and
- moderate Protestants and Catholics allow abortion, and may
or may not approve of capital punishment.
Hardly a moral absolute.
My disagreement of moral absolutism is threefold:
- my belief system does not come with a set of moral absolutes
predefined
- further, as a Taoist/Discordian, I do not believe in
absolute truths in general
- I
find it hard to find a set of prospective moral
absolutes that are sufficiently sensible and pervasive to adopt
absolutely.
Moral Relativism
This
would
appear to be the obvious alternative to Moral Absolutism. Moral
Relativism holds that morality is defined by culture. From this two
conclusions tend to be drawn:
- that one culture cannot judge the morality of another culture's
moral code; and
- that it is ok to define your own moral system (including a total
lack of morality).
Taken to the extreme, this seems to be an absurdity. It claims equal
validity for all moral codes, no matter how dysfunctional or bizarre.
Modified Moral Relativism
I
would therefore like to propose the following view of Moral Relativism:
- Whilst moralities vary across cultures, certain moral dictates
tend to be pervasive and serve a clear and necessary function in
preserving society (e.g. some sort of prohibition on killing). These
can therefore, in a generalised sense, serve as the basis of a
functional moral code.
- Some degree of variation of moral code across cultures,
subcultures and individuals is normal, and even in some circumstances
necessary.
- This variation will lead to a degree of bias in judging others'
moral code.
- However some cultures, subcultures or individuals may be
sufficiently dysfunctional that their moral code is likewise
dysfunctional. It is therefore not always unreasonable to pass
judgement on another's code.
- The validity of these judgments of dysfunctionality may however
be affected to some degree by your own bias.
In essense, I am proposing a middle ground between Absolute Absolutism
and Absolute Relativism. I suspect that this is how most people
actually live their lives most of the time. They merely ascribe to
Absolutism or Relativism in order to maintain the option to arbitrarily
impose their values on others, or avoid making reasonable and necessary
judgements, respectively.
Rights, Human and Otherwise
Morality is a method by which an individual or a culture adjudicates
conflicting interests. Some of these interests are considered to be
sufficiently important that they are termed "rights". These rights may
be ascribed to individuals pervasively (human rights), conditionally
(e.g. parental rights, citizenship) and to non-humans (e.g. animals
rights and rights of notional individuals, e.g. corporations).
These rights yield two important questions: what rights to grant and
who to grant them to?
What is human?
What constitutes human, from the viewpoint of ascribing rights? The
most obvious answer is purely biological, any member of species Homo
Sapiens. This definition is however problematical, as it would deny
rights to any hypothetical non-human sentience (be it alien or
artificial), and as it ascribes rights to entities that lack any
meaningful personhood or ability to exercise rights (e.g. a person in a
persistent vegetative state or a zygote).
Abortion - the “Right to Life”
I hold the concept that human rights and especially the "Right to Life"
begins at conception to be absurd. This ascribes rights to a single
cell. The only rationale for so ascribing would appear to be religious
beliefs, but even here the main group upholding this viewpoint,
conservative Christians, would appear to be on unstable ground. In
spite of the fact that abortion existed in Biblical times there is no
direct Biblical prohibition against abortion. The closest that
Christian Anti-abortion lobby appear to be able to come up with is
Exodus 21:22 which lists the penalty for an assault on a woman leading
her to miscarry to be a fine. This is hardly equating abortion with
murder.
Suicide and Voluntary Euthanasia - the “Right to Die”
Beyond religious convictions, there would appear to be no reason for a
society to forbid, outright, a person from taking their own right. It
would however have legitimate reasons for ensuring that this outcome is
only a last resort and not coerced.
Capital Punishment - the “Right to Kill”
I can see a number of arguments against capital punishment:
- It is not reversible if the conviction is found to be
erroneous.
- Attempts to mitigate this flaw by (not always particularly
successful) by attempting to reduce the error rate make it a very
expensive punishment.
- Its employment would appear to undermine its main purpose, to
deter premeditated killing. A state that regularly employs death as a
punishment will find it harder to convince groups or individuals that
it is immoral for them to likewise seek to impose it as a punishment.
- Extreme punishments would appear to have a diminishing marginal
effect. This is perhaps in part because those who general contemplate
acts sufficiently horrific to warrant such punishments appear to be
those least likely to be deterred by the prospect of punishment.
“A Just War”
Is war ever justified? Warfare is one of the most horrific acts that
humanity can visit on its fellows. As such, I would argue that it is
only justified as an act of self-defense.